

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 16-05-2006		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Building Maritime Security Capabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean Through the Excess Defense Articles Program			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) Matthew von Ruden Paper Advisor (if Any): Professor Ivan Luke, Professor Dario Teicher			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT Today's global security environment includes a growing number of transnational maritime threats, necessitating a cooperative multinational effort. This is particularly true in Latin America and the Caribbean, where military resource expenditures are among the lowest in the world. Many states in the region lack the basic military capabilities to effectively monitor maritime activity within their jurisdictions. Commander, United States Southern Command is responsible for meeting this unique security challenge, yet it is itself very constrained by resources. Fortunately, within the next decade there is an opportunity to develop the maritime security capabilities of our Latin American partners through the transfer of surplus legacy platforms of the United States Coast Guard through the Excess Defense Articles program. Using an operational-level analysis, this paper examines the potential effectiveness of these assets in furthering United States Southern Command's Theater Objectives.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS U.S. Coast Guard, Excess Defense Articles, U.S. Southern Command, Security Assistance, Maritime Security					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 18	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-846-0071



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI

BUILDING MARITIME SECURITY CAPABILITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN THROUGH THE EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES
PROGRAM

By

Matthew S. von Ruden
Commander, United States Coast Guard

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

16 May 2006

Abstract

Today's global security environment includes a growing number of transnational maritime threats, necessitating a cooperative multinational effort. This is particularly true in Latin America and the Caribbean, where military resource expenditures are among the lowest in the world. Many states in the region lack the basic military capabilities to effectively monitor maritime activity within their jurisdictions. Commander, United States Southern Command is responsible for meeting this unique security challenge, yet it is itself very constrained by resources. Fortunately, within the next decade there is an opportunity to develop the maritime security capabilities of our Latin American partners through the transfer of surplus legacy platforms of the United States Coast Guard through the Excess Defense Articles program. Using an operational-level analysis, this paper examines the potential effectiveness of these assets in furthering United States Southern Command's Theater Objectives.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
United States Southern Command and its Theater Strategy	2
An Opportunity	4
The Excess Defense Articles Process	6
Operational Analysis	7
Challenges.....	15
Recommendations.....	17
Conclusion	18
Notes	19
Bibliography	21

List of Tables and Figures

Table 1. United States Southern Command Theater-Strategic Objectives	4
Table 2. USCG Legacy Deepwater Surface Asset Summary	5
Table 3. Flight Deck Equipped Ships & Associated Aircraft in SOUTHCOM AOR.....	6
Figure 1. Illicit Vessel Activity 1 January to 15 August 2005.....	9

Introduction

In today's global security environment, the United States and other friendly nations face a growing number of transnational maritime threats, including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illicit trafficking, piracy, mass migration, natural disasters and humanitarian crises. This maritime security challenge far exceeds the capabilities of any single state's maritime forces. To effectively counter such threats, a cooperative multinational approach is clearly required. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral M.G. Mullen, advocates building a "1000 Ship Navy" - a maritime network built around the navies and coast guards of like-minded states throughout the world, each serving its own national interests while contributing to the common goal of global maritime security.¹ Such cooperation is particularly important to security in the Western Hemisphere. While global threats and international commitments continue to draw United States Navy (USN) forces to the other side of the globe, security threats loom large closer to home, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean. Unfortunately, this region is severely limited in military resources; the combined military expenditures of all the states in the hemisphere, less the United States and Canada, amount to less than four percent of the world's annual defense spending.² In fact, many states lack the basic military capabilities to effectively monitor maritime activity within their own territorial seas.

Commander, United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is responsible for meeting this unique security challenge, yet it is itself very constrained by resources. Fortunately, within the next decade there is an opportunity to develop the maritime security capabilities of our Latin American partners through the transfer of surplus legacy platforms of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) through the government's Excess Defense Articles program. Using an

operational-level analysis, this paper will illustrate the potential effectiveness of these assets in furthering SOUTHCOM's Theater Objectives.

United States Southern Command and its Theater Strategy

A brief overview of the SOUTHCOM Area of Operations (AOR) is illustrative of the need to build partner nation maritime capabilities in the region. SOUTHCOM's AOR is comprised of twelve Caribbean island states, the dependencies of France, Netherlands and United Kingdom, the nineteen states of Central and South America, and the surrounding waters of these states to include the Caribbean Sea, the Eastern Pacific and Western Atlantic Oceans. The United States' over-arching strategic-level objective in the region is to create and sustain a hemisphere of stable, prosperous, democratic states with shared values, efficient governments, free societies and open economies.³ The region is of great economic and strategic importance. Collectively, this group of countries is a major trading partner of the United States, with trade levels expected to exceed that of both Europe and Japan combined by 2010. The United States imports thirty-two percent of its oil from the Caribbean and Latin America compared to thirty percent from the Middle East. In addition, the Panama Canal is a lifeline for the United States economy and a strategic line of communication for its forces; security of the canal is of vital interest to the United States.⁴

The SOUTHCOM Theater Strategy is derived from and directly supports the President's National Security Strategy, the Secretary of Defense's National Defense Strategy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff National Military Strategy. It includes a security assessment, threats, challenges and strategic objectives for the AOR. The Combatant Commander's assessment of the security environment acknowledges that the likelihood of a conventional war in the region is very low, but identifies a complex set of regional threats that

pose a serious and growing security concern for the United States. Among them are illicit trafficking (narcotics, arms and humans), criminal gangs, kidnapping, document forgery, money laundering, mass migration and natural disasters. Because all of these threats are trans-national in nature, they require a cooperative multinational approach.⁵

Unfortunately, SOUTHCOM's efforts to organize such a multinational effort are impeded by a number of challenges. Many partner nation governments are fragile, young democracies that are vulnerable to internal threats such as corruption or political extremism. Most are faced with fiscal constraints that limit their ability to adequately fund an effective security force. Different standards for training, equipment and procedures greatly complicate efforts to conduct combined military or law enforcement operations. Legally, SOUTHCOM is constrained in its ability to provide military assistance to signatories of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court who have not signed Article 98 agreements with the United States. Finally, growing anti-United States sentiments among the people in the region limit the level of cooperation that political leaders are willing to exercise.⁶

In consideration of these threats and challenges, SOUTHCOM developed a Theater Strategy that includes a number of Theater-Strategic Objectives, summarized in Table 1. These objectives place a heavy emphasis on cooperation and shaping. Consequently, SOUTHCOM's Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) a critical supporting element. Developed in accordance with the Secretary of Defense's Security Cooperation Guidance and consistent with each country team's Mission Performance Plan, the classified TSCP establishes cooperative engagement priorities, defines regional objectives, and details Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) initiatives and special programs. Through TSC, the combatant commander seeks to build military relationships and partner nation capabilities, and to promote peacetime and contingency




access for United States forces.⁷ Although forces are not apportioned for the TSCP, combatant commanders are provided a number of tools (funded by various means) with which to meet shaping objectives.⁸ Among these are Counter Narco-Terrorism Support, Combined Education and Training, Exercises and Experimentation, Defense and Military Contacts, Humanitarian Assistance, Intelligence Cooperation, and Security Assistance. Included under this Security Assistance umbrella are the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Support for Direct Commercial Sales, and the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) programs.⁹

Table 1. United States Southern Command Theater-Strategic Objectives		
<i>Ensure the Forward Defense of the United States</i>	<i>Establish Regional Partnerships</i>	<i>Enhance Hemispheric Stability and Security</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assure partners and dissuade, deter and defeat transnational threats to United States and partner nation interests. • Develop a mechanism for information sharing so as to better detect, track and interdict illicit air and maritime traffic. • Ensure Access for Peacetime Operations and Contingency Response. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Foster Transparency • Support Professionalization of Military and Security Forces. • Develop Interoperability. • Promote and defend human rights. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support Partner Nations' Efforts to secure their territories and borders. • Protect International Lines of Communication.
Source: U. S. Southern Command, <i>A Theater Strategy of Focused Cooperation and Mutual Security</i> (Miami, October 2005), 7-11.		

An Opportunity

SOUTHCOM's shaping efforts would be strengthened by the introduction of additional maritime security assets throughout the region over the coming decades. The USCG is currently engaged in a major effort to recapitalize its aging fleet of "deepwater" assets – the major cutters and aircraft that operate off shore in support of the USCG's national defense, homeland security, law enforcement and search and rescue missions. As the new state-of-the-art platforms come into service, as many as thirty-nine legacy cutters will be decommissioned and become eligible for transfer to partner nations under the EDA program. Commissioned between 1964 and 1991,

the three major classes of cutters are well cared for and have undergone extensive system upgrades. In recent years, however, the cutters have experienced higher casualty rates and maintenance costs in the face of sustained operational tempos of 185-200 days at sea per year. The cutters are manpower intensive and lack the speed, sensors, communications and interoperability required by today's Coast Guard.¹⁰ Table 2 summarizes the pertinent characteristics of these three classes of cutters.

Table 2. USCG Legacy Deepwater Surface Asset Summary		
	378-foot High Endurance Cutter (WHEC) <i>Secretary and Hero Cutter Classes</i> Number in service USCG-wide: 12 Length: 378 feet Beam: 43 feet Displacement: 3,250 tons Power Plant: Two diesel engines/two gas turbine engines Commissioned: 1967-1972	Manning: 164 Annual Operating Costs - 2005 (a) Operations & Maintenance: \$3.76M Personnel: \$12.15M Projected Decommissioning Dates (b) FY 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 # 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 Pending Requests (c) Philippines
	210-foot Medium Endurance Cutter (WMEC) <i>Reliance Cutter Class</i> Number in service USCG-wide: 14 Length: 210 feet Beam: 34 feet Displacement: 1,000 tons Power plant: Two diesel engines Commissioned: 1964-1969	Manning: 70 Annual Operating Costs - 2005 (a) Operations & Maintenance: \$1.58M Personnel: \$5.95M Projected Decommissioning Dates (b) FY 17 18 19 20 21 22 # 1 3 2 3 2 3 Pending Requests (c) Philippines, Argentina, Uruguay, Ghana, Peru, Morocco, Tunisia, Pakistan
	270-foot Medium Endurance Cutter (WMEC) <i>Famous Cutter Class</i> Number in service USCG-wide: 13 Length: 270 feet Beam: 38 feet Displacement: 1,825 tons Power plant: Two diesel engines Commissioned: 1983-1991	Manning: 99 Annual Operating Costs - 2005 (a) Operations & Maintenance: \$2.51M Personnel: \$6.82M Projected Decommissioning Dates (b) FY 23 24 25 26 27 # 1 3 2 3 4 Pending Requests (c) Philippines, Argentina, Uruguay, Pakistan
Source: http://www.uscg.mil/datasheet/378whhec.htm (15 Sep 2005) http://www.uscg.mil/datasheet/210wmec.htm (21 Feb 2006) http://www.uscg.mil/datasheet/270wmec.htm (15 Sep 2005)		a. Steven P. Simpson, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Strategic and Business Planning (G-RRP-1), e-mail of 14 April 2006. Excludes Weapons Systems & Ordnance b. Mike Anderson, U.S. Coast Guard Integrated Deepwater System Program (G-DPM), e-mail of 17 April 2006. c. Gary Connor, U.S. Coast Guard Office of International Affairs (G-CI), e-mail of 10 April 2006.

As the USCG's newer assets render these legacy cutters obsolete, they will remain valuable commodities on the international market, as indicated in the pending requests for the assets listed in Table 2. Markedly more capable than a typical patrol boat due to their helicopter flight decks, greater endurance and command and control functionality, these platforms would be

valuable additions to many maritime services. Lower labor rates and lower operational tempos will enable many states to operate these platforms at costs considerably below those of the United States. There is a particular need for these types of platforms in the coast guards and navies throughout the SOUTHCOM AOR, as shown in Table 3. There is not a single ship of this type in Central America or the Caribbean.

The Excess Defense Articles Process

EDA may be transferred in the form of a grant (zero cost) to qualified recipients under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or may be sold at a reduced price (five to fifty percent of original acquisition cost) under the Foreign Military Sales program authorized by the Arms Export Control Act. The executive agent for the process is the

Table 3. Flight Deck Equipped Ships & Associated Aircraft in SOUTHCOM AOR		
Argentina	11	Augusta SH3 Sea King Eurocopter AS 555 Fennec SA 319B Alouette III
Brazil	13 (incl. carrier)	A-4 Skyhawk Augusta SH3 A/D Sea King Aerospatiale UH-12/13/14 Westland Superlinc AH-11 Bell JetRanger CRU11
Chile	13	Aerospatiale NAS 332C Cougar MBB BO 105 C Bell 206B JetRanger Bell Textron 412
Colombia	5	Eurocopter AS 555 Fennec MBB BO 105 CB, Bell 412
Ecuador	8	Bell 206B
Peru	7	Augusta AB 212 ASW ASH-3D Sea King
Venezuela	7	Augusta AB 212 ASW
Source: Stephen Saunders, ed., <i>Jane's Fighting Ships 2005-2006</i> , 108 th edition. (Alexandria, VA: 2005), 9-921.		

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), whose guidelines are published in DoD 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual*. Excess items must be screened by the General Services Administration to become eligible for the program. Typically the availability of items is advertised through a “survey message” to United States Security Assistance Officers stationed throughout the world. Interested countries initiate the process with a Letter of Request (LOR), detailing the need for the asset, the intended use and any associated support requirements. The originating agency forwards the LOR with a recommendation to DSCA, which convenes an interagency (State, Defense, Commerce, JCS, and pertinent military representatives) “EDA Coordination Committee.” The committee forwards its recommendation through the DSCA Director (three-star flag officer) to the Department of State’s Bureau of Political/Military Affairs for approval. The transfer of warships requires authorizing legislation,

which may include restrictions or oversight provisions. The Navy International Programs Office is responsible for administering transfers of USCG vessels, under a 2004 Navy/CG memorandum of Agreement.¹¹ Within the USCG, the EDA Executive Agent is the Foreign Military Sales Policy Advisor, assigned to the Office of International Affairs.¹²

Under the Security Assistance program, the United States endeavors to provide the receiving country with a “total package” of training and logistics support. Costs are minimized by conducting a “hot transfer” to leverage the experience of United States operators in training the new crews. Spare parts, training and technical support are provided from the donor service on a cost-reimbursable basis, funded either by the recipient country or through authorized grant programs. In practice, there are some difficulties with the program. The timeline for approval varies considerably and may take over a year. This makes it very difficult for the recipient nation to prepare for delivery. Secondly, the expenses associated with even a “no-cost” transfer can be considerable. For example, the costs for initial training, parts and technical support for the 2003 transfer of a 210-foot WMEC to Colombia amounted to approximately one million dollars.¹³ Nevertheless, for many countries the EDA program is an affordable means of building their military capability. Historically, USCG assets have been in high demand. Since 1997, the USCG has transferred over 120 vessels to twenty-three countries including sixteen in the SOUTHCOM AOR.¹⁴

Operational Analysis

SOUTHCOM has recognized the need to build the maritime capabilities of partner nations in its AOR and has taken modest steps in this direction. An example is the “Enduring Friendship” pilot program aimed at improving the command, control and communications capabilities of maritime assets in targeted nations near the illicit trafficking lanes, budgeted at


four million dollars for fiscal year 2006.¹⁵ The prospect of strategically distributing these legacy USCG cutters throughout the SOUTHCOM AOR holds great promise for furthering theater objectives on a much larger scale at a minimal cost. This analysis will assess the potential benefits as they apply to specific SOUTHCOM objectives, drawing upon the principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Multinational Operations, as contained in joint doctrine.

Enforce Partner Nations' Efforts to Secure their Territories and Borders. The majority of countries in the region claim territorial seas (TTS) and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) extending twelve and 200 nautical miles from the baseline, respectively. Some notable exceptions are Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru each whom claim 200 nautical mile TTS's that are not recognized by the United States. Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands claim a three nautical mile TTS, while the Dominican Republic claims six nautical miles.¹⁶ With the exception of perhaps Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Venezuela, none of the countries in the region have the resources to effectively monitor activity or enforce laws throughout their maritime jurisdictions. The small patrol boats and open-hulled launches that comprise the majority of the region's maritime forces lack the endurance, sensors, communications equipment and sea-keeping characteristics required to operate effectively offshore.

This limitation amounts to a lack of credible deterrence to illicit traffickers and is counter to the MOOTW principle of Perseverance.¹⁷ As a result, there is essentially a free flow of illicit maritime traffic in national waters throughout the region. In fact, illegal traffickers take advantage of lightly patrolled territorial seas to evade the United States law enforcement presence operating in international waters. Figure 1 illustrates the level of illicit vessel activity

in the region. A lack of law enforcement presence in the EEZ has similar consequences - states are vulnerable to foreign exploitation of increasingly valuable fish stocks.

The addition of an offshore patrol capability with reasonable endurance, sea keeping, sensors and communications would enable recipient nations to better monitor their maritime borders and protect their national interests within their maritime domains. For example, USCG experience has shown that a larger vessel patrolling seaward of the territorial



sea working with smaller patrol craft closer to shore (under its tactical control) provides for an effective layered defense to detect and interdict suspect vessels as they approach shore or transit the TTS. In addition, the larger vessel can refuel and otherwise support the smaller assets, increasing their time on station and overall effectiveness. The addition of a shipboard helicopter, if available, more than doubles a vessel's probability of detection of illicit vessel traffic for a typical search area.¹⁸ Such improved capabilities by more states in the region would help them to better patrol their maritime domains and greatly enhance regional security.

Assure Partners and Dissuade, Deter, and Defeat Transnational Threats to United States and Partner Nation Interests. Figure 1 illustrates the importance of securing territorial seas to counter-narcotics operations. Trafficking is typically a two-step process, at a minimum, that exploits the weakness of other states' security to facilitate trans-shipment to the United States or Europe. By denying traffickers the protection of poorly patrolled TTS's, the United States and

its partners can force the traffickers into international waters, where they are most vulnerable to detection and interdiction by United States or coalition military and law enforcement assets.

Building such capabilities among our partner nations while respecting their sovereignty would go a long way toward assuring them of sustained United States support. Consistent with the MOOTW principle of Restraint, the introduction of former USCG assets is likely to be viewed more favorably than more lethal platforms, such as USN combatants.¹⁹ Ideally, any asset transferred would be accompanied by other TSCP elements such as technical support, training, mil-to-mil contact, combined exercises, and intelligence sharing. Such additional engagement opportunities are arguably just as important as the asset itself in furthering Theater objectives.

Develop Mechanism for Information Sharing to Better Detect, Track and Interdict Illicit Air and Maritime Traffic. Each of the legacy cutters under consideration is equipped with substantial C4ISR capabilities including secure HF, VHF, UHF and satellite communications, secret internet protocol network (SIPRNET), a Shipboard Command and Control System, surface (and on the 378-foot WHEC, air) search radars, and maritime Forward Looking Infra-red Scope (MARFLIR). These capabilities currently facilitate effective USCG operations with SOUTHCOM's Joint Interagency Task Force South and its assigned surface and air assets. Continued operation of these cutters by partner nations would expand the total resources available and facilitate information exchange to better detect, track and interdict illicit traffickers. This ability to share tactical information in support of common operational objectives is fundamental to the MOOTW principle of Unity of Effort.²⁰

Develop Interoperability. Perhaps the greatest benefit of building partner nation maritime security capability around these legacy USCG assets is the potential for improved interoperability. Interoperability is the ability of forces to provide services to and accept services

from other forces to facilitate effective cooperation. When accompanied by rationalization and standardization, interoperability is a fundamental requirement for successful multinational operations. Rationalization refers to the most efficient use of coalition resources; for example, the use of a guided missile destroyer for alien migrant interdiction may not be the best use of the platform, particularly if a USCG or partner nation asset is available for the job. Standardization is a process for achieving the highest level of cooperation by establishing common or compatible procedures, equipment and tactics.²¹ While hardware alone does not produce any of these cooperative attributes, it is a key enabler. These ships could facilitate not only bilateral cooperation with the United States, but just as importantly, inter-cooperation among partner nations in the region. A number of such assets operating throughout the AOR under partner nation flag could open the door for successful multinational operations across the spectrum of mission areas, and make it less likely that U.S. forces will be called upon to respond to regional problems.²²

Alien migration is a persistent threat in the Caribbean basin. The major source countries include Haiti, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic.²³ Migrants routinely put to sea in grossly overloaded boats or makeshift rafts en route the United States. This is both a security and safety-of-life concern for the United States and its regional partners. At-sea interdictions by the USCG exceeded 10,000 people in both 2004 and 2005. The heaviest flow of migrants on record occurred in 1994, when the USCG interdicted over 63,400 migrants at sea.²⁴ Another mass migration on this scale from one or more countries in the region could quickly overwhelm United States capacity. An added complication is that the United States Naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, historically used as an interim holding facility during such crises, may not be available when needed due to its current use as an enemy combatant detention facility for

the Global War on Terror. Partner nation contributions of additional vessels with search and rescue capability and large migrant holding capacity could save thousands of lives and help facilitate a more cooperative approach to such humanitarian crises in the region.

In the “War on Drugs” the potential benefit of this added partner nation capability increases with the level of interoperability achieved. In addition to the establishment of local sea control within each nation’s territorial sea and the many benefits of information sharing already discussed, the operation of such assets in international waters could facilitate cooperative law enforcement agreements and expanded employment of airborne use of force.

The United States currently employs bilateral agreements with twenty-two partner nations in the region that include up to eight areas of cooperation, including ship boarding, ship rider, pursuit, entry-to investigate, over flight and ordering suspect aircraft to land.²⁵ These agreements enable the USCG to act in a law enforcement capacity on behalf of the partner nation to enforce the partner nation’s laws on vessels flying the partner nation’s flag when there is reasonable suspicion of illicit activity.²⁶ As other states’ coast guards become more capable and routinely operate in international waters, similar such agreements could be established between regional partners, greatly reducing the legal barriers to interdiction on the high seas. Even greater cooperation could be achieved through universal membership in the Caribbean Regional Maritime Agreement, a multilateral law enforcement agreement initiated by Costa Rica in 2003 and signed by ten countries in the region to date.²⁷

Another opportunity for interoperability in the counter-narcotics mission is to use partner nation shipboard flight decks to extend the range of USCG helicopters, both in routine surface patrols and in the delivery of airborne use of force. Since 1998, the USCG has employed armed helicopters to stop one hundred profile “go-fast” narcotics trafficking vessels, resulting in the

seizure of over 269,000 lbs. of cocaine valued at over eight billion dollars.²⁸ This type of vessel currently accounts for sixty percent of maritime cocaine traffic in the region.²⁹ Yet USCG helicopters are limited in their range to approximately 150 miles. The addition of partner nation cutters that could recover, refuel and launch these helicopters would greatly increase their effective search and interdiction range.

In addition to Alien Migrant Interdiction and Counter-Narcotics operations, an interoperable multinational maritime force in the region could save countless lives through coordinated search and rescue efforts, hurricane and other disaster response, and humanitarian assistance operations. Clearly such levels of cooperation are predicated upon standardization of equipment, tactics and procedures, which could only be developed through extensive combined training and experimentation.

Protect International Lines of Communication. Protecting the free flow of shipping through the Panama Canal was the primary concern of Alfred Thayer Mahan in his argument for developing United States Sea Power. This international line of communication remains important today, both to the United States and our regional partners. Yet the navies of Panama and other states in the region are ill equipped to provide the level of security needed in today's environment. A recent SOUTHCOM assessment of Panama's National Maritime Service recommended improvements in offshore patrol endurance and the acquisition of a secure ship-to-shore communications capability to improve the effectiveness of Panama's offshore security.³⁰

The addition of one or more legacy USCG cutters would meet both of these requirements.

Support Professionalization of Military and Security Forces. For many countries in the region whose maritime services have only operated small patrol boats, the operation of even the smallest of these legacy USCG assets would require a quantum leap forward in professional skill

and knowledge. For the larger countries with experienced navies, the challenge would be to develop compatible tactics and procedures to enable interoperability. Fortunately, SOUTHCOM has a model solution for both of these problems in the Caribbean Support Tender (CST). Authorized by Congress in 1988, the CST is an internationally crewed training and support vessel operated by the USCG and supported by SOUTHCOM to “provide technical assistance, including law enforcement training, for foreign coast guards, navies and other maritime services.” The vessel is billeted for twenty-nine USCG personnel and sixteen international representatives from seven Caribbean countries: Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Panama, Bahamas, Jamaica, Guyana, and Surinam. Additional riders from Colombia, Venezuela, Honduras, Belize, El Salvador and Haiti have also trained on the tender. Past crewmembers have gone on to fill key positions in their countries’ maritime services. In eighty-eight port visits to twenty-two countries, the vessel’s crew has delivered spare parts, technical training/assistance and maintenance support. It has conducted extensive in port and underway operational training in law enforcement, damage control, navigation, refueling-at-sea, small boat operations, gunnery and helicopter operations, as well as command and control, On-Scene Commander, and Task Unit Commander procedures. The CST has proven highly effective in keeping older EDA assets operational, and in enhancing maritime interoperability throughout the Caribbean.³¹

Were this 61 year old former buoy tender replaced with a legacy medium endurance cutter, it could serve to develop and reinforce the necessary skills, tactics and procedures required for interoperability among like-vessels in the region. It would be most valuable in establishing common facility, equipment and training standards required for multinational helicopter operations. While the costs of operating and maintaining helicopters, not to mention

the training and retention of qualified pilots, is beyond the reach of most nations in the region, maintaining a functional flight deck is a matter of meeting facility standards (certification) and recurrent standardization training requirements (qualification).³² An international crew trained to United States standards could export this professionalism throughout the region with a deployed USCG helicopter, while routine training with USCG and USN assets operating in the area could provide additional training opportunities in the interim. Similar capabilities could be developed in the other mission areas discussed previously, training to USCG doctrine or that otherwise established by SOUTHCOM. Such an initiative could strengthen both the capabilities and legitimacy of regional maritime services, consistent with SOUTHCOM objectives and MOOTW principles.

Challenges

There are a number of significant challenges that could prevent the realization of the potential benefits discussed in this paper. These include resource limitations and the national will of partner nations, difficulties with the EDA process, competition from other Regional Combatant Commanders, and the availability and sustainability of the assets.

While the EDA process can provide partner nations a functional asset essentially for free, the costs to operate and maintain even the smallest vessel are substantial and beyond the capabilities of many countries in the region. Of the thirty-one states (excluding European dependencies) in the region, only twelve maintain maritime forces of over 1000 personnel.³³ Thus, only the largest of navies in the hemisphere would likely be able to operate the large 378-foot cutters. Foreign military assistance can help, but only if the country is committed to building its maritime security force. SOUTHCOM, working with the Department of State,

would need to gage the capabilities and national will, and consider the strategic priority, of potential recipients to determine the candidates with the highest probability for success.

As discussed, the EDA process is complicated and full of uncertainty, making it difficult for both the United States and partner nations to effectively plan, budget and otherwise prepare for the transfer. SOUTHCOM could alleviate some of this uncertainty by shepherding the process; that is, identifying recipient countries well in advance, coordinating the efforts of the respective Security Assistance Officers, soliciting Letters of Request, pushing the cases through the EDA committee with a well developed package of supporting requirements, and seeking timely legislative approval.

Another complication is the 2002 American Service Member's Protection Act, which withholds military assistance to signatories of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court who have not signed Article 98 agreements with the United States. While the EDA process is not directly affected by the Act, other supporting forms of Security Assistance are, such as the Foreign Military Financing and some forms of training.³⁴

SOUTHCOM may need to compete with other Regional Combatant Commanders for these resources. As shown in Table 2, a number of states outside of the SOUTHCOM AOR have already submitted Letters of Request for these legacy deepwater assets. Nevertheless, there are distinct advantages to distributing the assets within SOUTHCOM's AOR. Chief among them are the high regional density of partner nations and their close proximity to the United States. This would facilitate follow-on maintenance and training support by United States forces during routine operations. It would also improve the potential for interoperability, both with U.S forces and among partner nations. Other SOUTHCOM advantages include alignment of United States

and partner nation regional objectives and the proven suitability of these platforms for countering regional threats.

Finally, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the availability and ultimate condition of the legacy assets. Under the USCG acquisition strategy, the systems integration contractor plays a leading role in determining the ultimate timeline for decommissioning the vessels. Thus far this schedule has been extremely fluid.³⁵ A related factor is the possibility that the USCG could increase the operational tempo of the legacy assets in their final years through rotational crewing initiatives, while curtailing maintenance efforts – essentially a “run to failure” approach. The EDA process can only support the TSCP if the assets are in good materiel condition at the time of transfer.

Recommendations

Fortunately, there is considerable time available to develop a plan to better capitalize on the availability of these valuable assets. The program would be one carried out over several decades, rather than years. To best further the development of maritime security capabilities in the Caribbean and Latin America, SOUTHCOM and the USCG should consider the following:

- (1) Working with the Department of State, SOUTHCOM should identify a prioritized list of recipient candidates based on TSC priorities, partner nation capability assessments and national will.
- (2) SOUTHCOM and the USCG should work together to identify, fund and develop the necessary support requirements to make this program successful. Among them are training requirements, development of supporting operational doctrine, and maintenance guidelines. Serious consideration should be given to the creation of a “Caribbean Training Cutter” to replace the Caribbean Support Tender, in order to develop the

competencies necessary to operate these assets, provide technical and maintenance support, and support regional standardization and interoperability.

(3) The USCG should consider SOUTHCOM's Theater objectives as one factor in its legacy asset decommissioning plan.

(4) Taking all of the above into consideration, SOUTHCOM should fully develop an implementation plan with appropriate measures of effectiveness. The plan should be incorporated into SOUTHCOM's Theater Security Cooperation Plan.

Conclusion

The 2005 *National Strategy for Maritime Security* echoes Admiral Mullen's vision of a "1000 Ship Navy" by including "Enhance International Cooperation" as its first strategic action. It commits the United States to building the maritime security capabilities of other key nations by, among other means, (1) offering maritime assistance, training and consultation; (2) coordinating and prioritizing maritime security assistance and liaison within regions; (3) allocating economic assistance to developing nations for maritime security to enhance security and prosperity.³⁶ The strategic distribution of legacy USCG assets by SOUTHCOM is a cost effective means of carrying out this national strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean. Rather than relegating these aging cutters to the scrap yard, SOUTHCOM has an opportunity to leverage them as a means for further Theater Security Cooperation across the range of engagement activities – to build military relationships, build partner nation capabilities, and promote peacetime and contingency access for United States forces. While enjoying operational benefits in a variety of mission areas, SOUTHCOM could build the foundation of a lasting multinational security framework that could benefit the region and United States security interests for years to come.

Bibliography

- Anderson, Mike. Surface Program Manager, U.S. Coast Guard Integrated Deepwater System Program (G-DPM). E-mail of 17 April 2006.
- Beardsworth, Randy. "Maritime Counter-Narcotics Agreements: The Cop on the Beat." In *Security in the Caribbean Basin – The Challenge of Regional Cooperation*, ed. Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2000.
- Connor, Gary. Foreign Military Sales Policy Advisor, U.S. Coast Guard Office of International Affairs. Telephone interview by author, 13 April 2006.
- _____. E-mail of 10 April 2006.
- Morgan, John G. Jr. and Charles W. Martoglio. "The 1,000 Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network." *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 131, no. 11 (November 2005): 14-17.
- Patterson, Anne W., Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Affairs, Department of State. "Counternarcotics Strategy in Latin America." Testimony Before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. Washington D.C., 30 March, 2006.
- Teicher, Dario. Faculty, Joint Military Operations Department, U.S. Naval War College. Interview by the author. Newport, RI, 23 March 2006.
- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Fact Book*, "Field Listings – Maritime Claims." <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2106.html>> [29 March 2006].
- U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. U.S. Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*. Washington D.C., 16 June 1995.
- _____. U.S. Joint Publication 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*. Washington D.C., 5 April 2000.
- U.S. Department of Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, *Security Assistance Textbook* (Online Green Book, Revised January 2005). <http://disam.osd.mil/pubs/DR/greenbook.htm> [3 April 2006].
- U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency. "Program Definition for Excess Defense Articles." <http://www.dsca.mil/programs/eda/progdef.htm> [23 March 2006].

- _____. *Security Assistance Management Manual*, DoD 5105.38-M. Washington D.C., 3 October 2003.
- U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Security Cooperation Guidance*. Washington, D.C., Nov 2005 (UNCLAS portions).
- U.S. Department of Defense. U.S. Southern Command. *A Theater Strategy of Focused Cooperation and Mutual Security*. Miami, FL, 2005.
- _____. “Caribbean Support Tender.”
<http://scnet.hq.southcom.smil.mil/tcmis/new/content/documents/Caribbean%20Support%20Tender.htm> [17 April 2006].
- _____. “Panama Security Cooperation – Enduring Friendship Maritime Security Assessment.” Miami, 11 October 2005.
- _____. *Theater Security Cooperation Implementation Plan – Draft*. Miami, October 2005 (UNCLAS portions).
- U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Military Training Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005*. Joint Report to Congress pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Washington, D.C., 31 January 2005.
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security. U.S. Coast Guard. “Foreign Transfers of U.S. Coast Guard Vessels.” COMDTINST M570.1. Washington, D.C., 3 November 2000.
- _____. “Alien Migrant Interdiction: CY 1982 to Present.” <<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/AMIO/FlowStats/CY.htm>> [21 April 2006].
- _____. COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-R// 071916Z APR 06, “ONE HUNDREDTH AIRBORNE USE OF FORCE INTERDICTION.”
- _____. “Foreign Military Sales.” <<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/gci/affairs/military/default.htm>> [18 June 2004].
- _____. “Integrated Deepwater System.”
<<http://www.uscg.mil/deepwater/program/program.htm>> [02 January 2006].
- _____. *Shipboard-Helicopter Operational Procedures Manual*, COMDTINST M3710.2D. Washington, D.C., 16 October 2001.
- Saunders, Stephen, ed. *Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006*, 108th edition. Alexandria, VA, 2006.
- Simpson, Steven P. U.S. Coast Guard Office Strategic and Business Planning (G-RRP-1). E-mail of 14 April 2006.

Vego, Milan N. *Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: The United States Naval War College, 2000.

White House, *The National Strategy for Maritime Security*. Washington, D.C., September 2005.

White, Howard. U.S. Coast Guard 7th District Office of Law Enforcement, "Caribbean Law Enforcement Overview." Presented to U.S. Naval War College elective course 633B, *Latin America: The Security Challenge*. Newport, RI, January 2006.

Notes

¹ John G. Morgan Jr., Charles W. Martoglio, “The 1,000 Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network,” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 131, no. 11 (November 2005): 14-17.

² Department of Defense, U.S. Southern Command, *A Theater Strategy of Focused Cooperation and Mutual Security* (Miami, FL, 2005), 4-5.

³ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁷ Department of Defense, U.S. Southern Command, *Theater Security Cooperation Implementation Plan* (TSCP) - Draft (Miami, October 2005), 1-3 (UNCLAS portions).

⁸ Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Security Cooperation Guidance* (Washington, D.C., Nov 2005), 1-28 (UNCLAS portions).

⁹ SOUTHCOM TSCP - Draft, A-3 (UNCLAS portions).

¹⁰ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, “Integrated Deepwater System,” <<http://www.uscg.mil/deepwater/program/program.htm>> (02 January 2006).

¹¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Security Assistance Management Manual*, DoD 5105.38-M (Washington D.C., October 2003), 446-458.

¹² Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, *Foreign Transfers of U.S. Coast Guard Vessels*, COMDTINST M570.1 (Washington, D.C., 3 November 2000), 1-3.

¹³ Gary Connor, Foreign Military Sales Policy Advisor, U.S. Coast Guard Office of International Affairs, telephone interview by author, 13 April 2006.

¹⁴ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, “Foreign Military Sales,” <<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-ci/affairs/military/default.htm>> (18 June 2004).

¹⁵ SOUTHCOM TSCP, Appendix 1 to Annex B, B-3 to B-5.

¹⁶ U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Fact Book*, “Field Listings – Maritime Claims,” <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2106.html>> (29 March 2006).

¹⁷ Department of Defense, U.S. Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington D.C., 16 June 1995), II-1 to II-8.

¹⁸ Howard White, U.S. Coast Guard 7th District Office of Law Enforcement, “Caribbean Law Enforcement Overview,” presented to U.S. Naval War College elective course 633B, Latin America: The Security Challenge (Newport, RI, January 2006).

¹⁹ U.S. Joint Pub 3-07.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Department of Defense, U.S. Joint Publication 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations* (Washington D.C., 5 April 2000), I-9 to I-12.

²² U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Military Training Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005. Joint Report to Congress, Vol. I* (Washington D.C., 31 January 2005), II-1.

²³ Howard White.

²⁴ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Law Enforcement, “Alien Migrant Interdiction: CY 1982 to Present,” <<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/AMIO/FlowStats/CY.htm>> (21 April 2006).

²⁵ Howard White.

²⁶ Randy Beardsworth, “Maritime Counter-Narcotics Agreements: The Cop on the Beat,” in *Security in the Caribbean Basin – The Challenge of Regional Cooperation*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2000) 198-201.

²⁷ Howard White.

²⁸ COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-R// 071916Z APR 06, “ONE HUNDREDTH AIRBORNE USE OF FORCE INTERDICTION.”

²⁹ Howard White.

³⁰ Department of Defense, U.S. Southern Command, “Panama Security Cooperation – Enduring Friendship Maritime Security Assessment,” (Miami, 11 October 2005), 3-4.

³¹ Department of Defense, U.S. Southern Command, “Caribbean Support Tender,” <http://scnet.hq.southcom.smil.mil/tcmis/new/content/documents/Caribbean%20Support%20Tender.htm> (17 April 2006).

³² Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, *Shipboard-Helicopter Operational Procedures Manual*, COMDTINST M3710.2D (Washington, D.C., 16 October 2001), 3-1 to 3-14.

³³ Stephen Saunders, ed., *Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006*, 108th edition. (Alexandria, VA, 2005), 9-921.

³⁴ Gary Connor.

³⁵ Mike Anderson, U.S. Coast Guard Integrated Deepwater System Program (G-DPM), e-mail of 17 April 2006.

³⁶ White House, *The National Strategy for Maritime Security* (Washington, D.C., September 2005), 14-15.